Introduction
The question of how we should reshape the notion of physical reality after the advent of quantum mechanics continues to hold a central position in foundational debates, whereas the startling advances in experimental physics, and especially in quantum optics, seem to open up new ways of addressing the foundational issues in quantum mechanics. In particular, the scope of the Bell theorem and the exact nature of the constraints it prescribes for any consistent theory of quantum phenomena still remain crucial in most discussions even in very recent times.
In the April, 19 2007 issue of Nature an article was published (Gröblacher et al (2007) ) in which a new experimental procedure was proposed for testing an inequality derived within a new class of theories, called non-local realistic theories (a class of theories originally introduced in Leggett (2003) ). The authors could show that this inequality, which is derivable from the conditions of the above-mentioned non-local realistic theories, is at variance with the predictions of quantum mechanics: since -according to the authors -the Bell theorem shows that local realistic theories are incompatible with quantum mechanics, the conclusion of Gröblacher et al was that realism cannot be maintained even in a wide class of theories in which the locality requirement is relaxed.
As will be shown more in detail later, the whole enterprise depends crucially on the claim that the Bell theorem has within its premises both locality and a condition called 'realism', a condition which is often formulated, even recently, as the idea that physical systems are endowed with certain pre-existing properties, namely properties possessed by the systems prior and independently of any measurement interaction and that determine or may contribute to determine the measurement outcomes (Gröblacher S. et al (2007) , p. 871). Although it has been clearly shown -from the original 1964 Bell paper right up to more recent instances (Maudlin (1996) , Norsen (2007) ) -that the Bell theorem does not include any 'realism' among its assumptions and that the non-locality established by the theorem holds for any theory that preserves quantum-mechanical predictions, be it 'realistic' or 'non-realistic', there seems to be a die-hard tendency to regard the Bell theorem as a result that does not establish non-locality but rather the impossibility of any objective (i.e. observerindependent in principle) account of the physical world, provided quantum mechanics is taken for All this suggests that a re-assessment of the question is still needed: the present paper is meant to show how the above-mentioned incorrect interpretation of the Bell theorem leads to carrying out the pursuit of implausible research programs on the foundations of quantum mechanics.
The plan of the paper is the following. In section 2 I will summarize the main claims contained in Gröblacher et al (2007) and concerning (i) the role of the so-called local realism in several versions of the Bell theorem (in fact the claim on this point represents views expressed implicitly or explicitly in many other more or less recent places disseminated in the literature, especially in the field of the quantum theory of information and computation); (ii) the prospects of investigating a new class of theories -called non-local realistic theories -as a consequence of the interpretation attached to the meaning of the Bell theorem according to (i). Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to a critical analysis of such claims: since the logically fundamental claim of these authors is that the Bell theorem is a consequence of assuming locality and realism, the aim of these sections is to show in what sense no independent 'realistic' assumption plays any role in establishing the conclusion of the Bell theorem, either in the strict (Bell (1964) ) or in the non-strict correlation framework (Bell (1971) , (1981)) 1 . In doing this, two collateral but important points will be stressed. Firstly, not only was no 'realistic' assumption de facto required in the proof of the Bell theorem (either in deterministic or in stochastic settings), but also that a possible interpretation of 'realism' in terms of a pre-existing property assumption is inconsistent with quantum mechanics (Bell (1966) , no matter whether locality or non-locality are taken into account or not (Laudisa (1997) ). Second, it will be stressed that Bell himself was perfectly clear about the irrelevance of any 'realistic' assumption for the derivation of his theorem (again, both in the deterministic and stochastic setting).
Finally in section 5, on the basis of the conclusions drawn in the preceding sections, I will argue against the relevance of assessing the compatibility with quantum mechanics of theories that are assumed to be non-local and yet realistic in the above mentioned ill-founded sense. I will also argue that endorsing such a sort of 'realism' leads first to the investigation of theories that are totally irrelevant from the viewpoint of the foundations of quantum mechanics, and secondly to overlook theories that are much more significant but which for very serious and structural reasons do not fall under the category of non-local realistic theories.
1 I speak here of 'realism' in quotation marks precisely because the controversial matter is just what it takes to be 'realistic' toward the quantum mechanical description of physical systems.
On the role of local realism in the Bell theorem
The best place to start is with the summary of the situation as depicted by Gröblacher et In the authors' text, the expression 'Bell's theorem' without qualification refers to the original 1964 formulation by John S. Bell, in which the ideal experimental setting contemplated the emission of pairs of spin-1/2 particles prepared at the source in the spin singlet state. In this ideal setting the source state of the joint system prescribes a strict anticorrelation between the measurement outcomes in the two wings of the experimental setting, whereas the measurement outcomes were supposed to be associated with spacetime regions that are space-like separated (Bell (1964) REALISM G&AL -The physical systems under scrutiny are endowed with pre-existing properties that (i) do not depend essentially on the measurement interactions the systems themselves may undergo, (ii) determine all the outcomes of possible measurements that can be performed on the physical systems.
The two points (i) and (ii) are reminiscent of the widespread terms 'Non-Contextuality' and 'Determinism', respectively. The point (i), in particular, seems to presuppose that, in order for a theory to be 'Realist G&AL ', the pre-existing properties do not depend on the measurement interactions in that they are passively revealed by the measurements themselves. 2 Clearly, the subscript 'G&AL' is meant to refer to the Gröblacher et al (2007) formulation of 'realism'.
As mentioned above, the idea that REALISM G&AL is an independent condition under whichjointly with a locality condition -the Bell theorem can be proved is still a widespread idea, that can be found formulated in essentially the same terms in several (more or less recent) texts, although in most of these texts it is far from clear whether the authors really assume REALISM G&AL , namely both conditions (i) and (ii) of the above definition or just one of them. In his Lectures on quantum theory Chris J. Isham, for instance, claims that in the usual spin correlation framework of the Bell theorem "the central realist assumption we are testing is that each particle has a definite value at all times for any direction of spin" (Isham (1995) , p. 215), and after the inequality has been derived we read (p. 216)
It is important to emphasize that the only assumptions that have gone into proving [the inequality] are:
1. For each particle it is meaningful to talk about the actual values of the projection of the spin along any direction.
2. There is locality in the sense that the value of any physical quantity is not changed by altering the position of a remote piece of measuring equipment.
In their book on the foundations of quantum computations and information, after summarizing the lesson that is supposed to be drawn from the Bell theorem, Michael A. Nielsen and Isaac L. Chuang claim:
What can we learn from Bell's inequality? For physicists, the most important lesson is that their deeply held commonsense intuitions about how the world works are wrong. The world is not locally realistic. Most physicists take the point of view that it is the assumption of realism which needs to be dropped from our worldview in quantum mechanics, although others have argued that the assumption of locality should be dropped instead. Regardless, Bell's inequality together with substantial experimental evidence now points to the conclusion that either or both of locality and realism must be dropped from our view of the world if we are to develop a good intuitive understanding of quantum The new step then would be to investigate the viability of a class of theories that accept a weakening of the locality requirement while sticking to a 'very plausible type of realism'. The upshot of this line of research consists finally in proving, via new testable inequalities, that no matter how non-local our theory might be, we cannot adhere to any reasonable form of realism whatsoever if we agree to preserve the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics.
The specific features of this new class of non-local realistic theories were proposed for the first time in Leggett (2003) . As a general premise, and in line with the above-mentioned quotations, Leggett proposes then introducing a class of non-local hidden-variable theories -namely a class of theories which, while retaining 'objectivity' (as will be seen later, it is the above-formulated REALISM G&AL condition), accept the incorporation of the possibility of non-local physical processes. The motivation for such a theoretical move is the following:
In my view, the point of considering such theories is not so much that they are in themselves a particularly plausible picture of physical reality, but that by investigating their consequences one may Such function is assumed to be independent of any parameter concerning polarizer settings (denoted in the sequel with a and b) and detection processes. Condition L1 expresses the requirement (i) of REALISM G&AL , condition L2 prevents the possibility of conspiratorial dependences between the source and any parameter involved in the spacetime regions where the polarizers and the detectors are located, whereas L3 allows for possibly non-local influences of polarizer setting parameters on the outcomes 6 . Clearly this last condition, which according to the Leggett terminology characterizes the theories of the class as crypto-nonlocal, is where the theory is supposed to go beyond the class of theories ruled out by the Bell theorem (according to the Leggett and followers' approach) 7 . Jointly, L1-L3 imply the following expression for the correlation to be measured P(a, b)
L3. If
In addition to L1-L3, it is assumed that the local averages 〈A〉 and 〈B〉 agree with the relevant quantum mechanical predictions, which appears to be a rather natural 'consistency' condition on the be learned, according to the last authors, is summarized in the conclusion of the article: 7 As a matter of fact, the Leggett-type of theories are 'realistic' hidden variable theories that are assumed to be non-local by accepting outcome independence but dropping parameter independence (according to the Shimony revision of the terminology introduced in Jarrett (1984) . I postpone to section 5 the discussion on how happily a REALISM assumption may coexist with parameter dependence. I wish also to stress that in presenting the Leggett framework I skip several technical details that, although deserving attention, are inessential to the present discussion.
We have experimentally excluded a class of important non-local hidden-variable theories. The aim of the subsequent sections is to show that these conclusions follow on from a totally 
REALISM in the strict anticorrelation framework
We have seen that according to both Leggett and Gröblacher et al, the heart of the Bell theorem is local realism and, as a matter of fact, all these authors refer explicitly to the celebrated article published by John S. Bell in 1964 when mentioning the Bell theorem. Curiously enough, the clearest and most useful starting point in order to see why their statements are wrong is exactly the opening of the 1964 Bell article (Bell (1964) ). In the first pages, Bell summarizes the EPR-Bohm incompleteness argument in order to state unambiguously the premises from which his own nonlocality theorem is to proceed. I will start first from the informal wording that Bell himself employs in stating the aim of his article, and I will proceed to a step-by-step formulation of the EPR-Bohm argument in order to show that a REALISM G&AL condition is derived and not assumed. Finally I will quote the Bell summary of the situation, a summary that once again states clearly the derivative character of REALISM G&AL .
John S. Bell opens his article as follows:
The paradox 8 As is well known, the EPR-Bohm framework consists in a system S 1 +S 2 of two spin-1/2 particles S 1 and S 2 prepared at time t 0 in the singlet spin state
where n is a generic spatial direction. We assume that spin measurements are performed on subsystems S 1 and S 2 at space-like separation. According to the standard rules of quantum mechanics, we know that
and, for any n,
• PERFECT ANTICORRELATION (PAC) If at time t a spin measurement is performed on the subsystem S 1 in direction n and the outcome +1 [−1] is obtained, then a spin measurement on the 8 By the way: in his celebrated 1964 paper, Bell himself -and this is not the least important aspect in which we should appreciate his clear thinking -simply pays lip service to the use of the word 'paradox' in connection with the EPR arrangement; for in the second line of the first page of the paper he aptly stresses that we deal with an argument, namely a finite and ordered sequence of sentences whose validity we can assess by individuating clearly the premises and by checking whether the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises themselves. As we will see briefly, the history of the misunderstandings in stating clearly which are the premises both of the EPR argument and of the derivation of the Bell-type inequalities is not over. And in the now classic 'Bertlmann's socks' paper (details below), Bell says: "And as if a child has asked: How come they always choose different colours when they are looked at? How does the second sock know what the first has done? Paradox indeed! But for the others, not for EPR. EPR did not use the word 'paradox'. They were with the man in the street in this business. For them these correlations simply showed that the quantum theorists had been hasty in dismissing the reality of the microscopic world." (Bell (2004) , p. 143) subsystem S 2 in the same direction n at an immediately subsequent time t′ ′ ′ ′ > t will have with
Let us suppose now that we perform at time t 1 > t 0 a spin measurement on S 1 in the direction n with outcome +1. Then, according to PAC, a spin measurement on S 2 in the same direction n at a time t 2 > t 1 will give with certainty the outcome −1. Let us suppose further to assume the following condition:
PROPERTY-DEFINITENESS -If, without interacting with a physical system S, we can predict with certainty -or with probability 1 -the value q of a physical quantity Q pertaining to S, then q represents an objective property of S (denoted by [q]).
It is worth stressing that this condition amounts not to assuming the existence of objective
properties, but rather to giving a sufficient condition for a property of a physical system to be 'objective'. In a nutshell: To sum up, the true logic of the argument is the following ('PP' stands for 'Pre-existing properties'): It will be urged that these analyses [i.e. the above mentioned proofs] leave the real question untouched. In fact it will be seen that these demonstrations require from the hypothetical dispersion free states, not only that appropriate ensembles thereof should have all measurable properties of quantum mechanical states, but certain other properties as well. These additional demands appear reasonable when results of measurement are loosely identified with properties of isolated systems.
They are seen to be quite unreasonable when one remembers with Bohr 'the impossibility of any sharp distinction between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear'. (Bell (1966) was introduced) a REALISM G&AL condition was among the assumptions that led to the derivation of a more general inequality, an inequality that can be shown to be violated by the corresponding statistical predictions of quantum mechanics.
In the stochastic hidden-variable theories' framework (originally introduced in Bell (1971) and Clauser, Horne (1974) ), a typical joint system S 1 +S 2 is prepared at a source -very much like the polarization process situation introduced in section 2 and concerning the Leggett approach -so that a 'completion' parameter λ is associated with the single and joint detection counts. Suppose we denote by a and b respectively the setting parameters concerning two detectors, located at spacelike separation and devised to register the arrival of S 1 and S 2 respectively. The model then is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
• BCH1. λ is distributed according to a function ρ(λ) that does not depend either on a or on b.
• BCH2. The parameter λ prescribes single and joint detection probability.
• BCH3. Locality holds, namely the λ-induced probability for the measurement outcomes for S 1 and S 2 separately is such that (i) the detection probability for S 1 depends only on λ and a,
(ii) the detection probability for S 2 depends only on λ and b, (iii) and the joint detection probability is simply the product of the detection probability for S 1 and the detection probability for S 2 .
According to the view presupposed in Leggett (2003) 1.
That is, since FW seems out of question, therefore the dilemma ¬ R ∨ ¬ LOC remains. It is at this point that the 'overinterpretation' paradox comes in. Since, according to the derivation above, we are left with the alternative ¬ R ∨ ¬ LOC, Žukowski sees no compelling justification for dropping LOC rather than R. In Žukowski's view the 'overinterpretation' of the Bell theorem would be exactly the 'automatic' move from ¬ R ∨ ¬ LOC to ¬ LOC, a move that in logical terms is not necessary . where clearly h A and h B denote respectively the rate of heart attacks in A and in B. Since A and B are supposed to be so far away from each other that it is not imaginable at the outset that there is some direct influence at work, a sound scientific attitude would lead us first -Bell claims -to make the hypothesis that there are some factors that contribute locally to the apparently correlated rates.
Let us call these collective factors L A and L B . According to this locality assumption, it will be then reasonable to assume
where λ denotes collectively any other relevant variables.
The attitude toward the justification of the locality condition in terms of a similar 'factorizability' in the derivation of the Bell inequality for stochastic hidden variables models is essentially the same: "let us suppose that the correlations in the EPR experiment are likewise «locally explicable» (Bell (1981) , in Bell (2004) , p. 152). Namely, the core of the argument lies in stating what preventing any action-at-a-distance amounts to, whatever the factors at A and B might be. The above assumption need not be grounded on the additional assumption that there are some pre-existing properties in the common past of the relevant events at A and B that enhance the correlation 15 . Such assumption would be certainly sufficient for the assumption of existence of local factors, but not necessary. Namely, it is true that the assumption of pre-existing properties for the two systems at the source might well imply locality, but the assumption that only local operations and influences can contribute to fix the single detection probabilities need not follow from preexisting properties, and rightly so: as we stressed in the previous section, assuming pre-existing properties in a model that is to be tested against quantum mechanics, when quantum mechanics itself prevents us from allowing pre-existing properties when describing physical interactions in its own proper terms, would deprive the model under scrutiny of any foundational significance. 
On the significance of non-local REALISTIC theories
We are now in a position to assess the prospects and the significance of the investigations on the new class of non-local REALISTIC G&AL hidden-variable theories, the class for which Leggett (2003) claims the proof of a new 'incompatibility' theorem, the latest in a long series of 'no-go theorems' about quantum mechanics. But let me sum up first the conclusions established in the preceding sections.
(1) The condition that we have referred to as REALISM G&AL is not a reasonable condition to require from any meaningful hidden variable theory, since it would make the confrontation between such theory and quantum mechanics totally uninteresting. Should REALISM G&AL be required, quantum mechanics would be in outright contradiction with the hidden variable theory, no matter whether any statistical predictions are taken into account or whether any experiment is carried out, but ruling out such a vacuous hidden variable theory would not teach us any useful lesson about the foundations of quantum mechanics. A clear formulation of this fact is already contained in the two groundbreaking -but still misunderstood! -articles by John S. Bell published in 1964 and 1966.
(2) Even if ex absurdo we suppose that REALISM G&AL is a reasonable requirement, it can be shown (and this is to be credited again to John S. Bell) that such requirement plays no fundamental role in the Bell theorem, either in its strict correlation version or in its non-strict correlation version.
If this is the case, the meaning of the Bell theorem lies not in its casting light on how far we should go in renouncing our cherished 'realistic' view of the microworld if we want to maintain the statistical and empirical content of quantum theory, but rather in demostrating once and for all that any theory (be it endowed with 'hidden variables' or not) that is to save the agreement with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics must be non-local. What non-locality exactly will entail in a specific theory will depend on the particular structure and conceptual resources of the theory, but two features will have to be part of any such theory: first, the theory will have to take into account non-locality as a basic property at least of the world of microscopic systems and, second, if the theory is introduced as endowed with a clear ontology -namely, endowed with some clear indications as to the nature and structure of that basic spacetime inventory of the world that the theory is supposed to be about -the ontology itself could not possibly be simply 'realistic' in the unreasonable sense of REALISM G&AL .
Under (1) and (2), the research program of non-local REALISTIC G&AL hidden-variable theories can then have no foundational significance, in that we can hardly learn anything from the attempt of establishing the compatibility or incompatibility of quantum mechanics with a class of theories satisfying such unreasonable assumptions. As a consequence, if REALISM G&AL is not a reasonable assumption to make for any significant alternative theory that is to be tested against quantum mechanics, this will hold both for local REALISTIC G&AL hidden-variable theories and for non-local REALISTIC G&AL hidden-variable theories.
But let us go further and take a closer look at the motivations that Leggett himself discusses in support of the assumptions satisfied by his non-local REALISTIC G&AL hidden-variable theories. Clearly, under Outcome Independence (SI) and Setting Independence (OI), the expression for the correlation P(a, b) to be measured becomes
namely, the usual expression for the locality assumption in stochastic hidden variable models. The
Leggett-type of theories, in addition to L1 and L2, are assumed to satisfy Outcome Independence but in general fail to satisfy Setting Independence. That is, the Leggett framework inherits the interpretation of locality as a conjunction of SI and OI (Jarrett (1984)) 16 and then proposes investigating the compatibility with quantum mechanics of a theory which -although 'realistic' - In fact, it can be proved that quantum mechanics violates Outcome Independence 17 . Then, although it is conceivable that a model intended to be 'strongly' non-local is formulated to be -as it were -'more non-local' than quantum mechanics itself is supposed to be (namely by dropping 16 Personally I do not find the 'peaceful coexistence' strategy (for instance, Shimony (1984) ), relying on the Jarrett distinction, either convincing or illuminating on the issue of how quantum mechanical non-locality is supposed to coexist with special relativity (see for instance Maudlin ( 2002 2 ), pp. 93-98). Here I presuppose it only the sake of discussion. 17 See for instance Butterfield, Fleming, Ghirardi, Grassi (1993 So, Leggett, Gröblacher and the others fail to appreciate that the consistency of Bohmian mechanics is a direct refutation of their approach since they appear to assume that the preexisting properties that determine the outcome must somehow mathematically resemble the eigenstates of Hermitian operators. But that very specific claim is surely no part of "realism". One needs to note that standard quantum theory associates physically different experimental set-ups with the same Hermitian operator ("observable"). But it is no part of "realism" to demand that physically different set-ups be treated alike: the way that the pre-existent positions determine the outcome of an experiment may of course depend on just how the experiment is set up. (namely observer-free) interpretations that are both consistent and alternative to quantum mechanics in a viable sense.
Conclusions
As I have tried to show in the preceding sections, there is a strong prejudice surrounding the foundational meaning of the Bell theorem, a prejudice that seems to survive intact through the years, in spite of the clear statements to the contrary repeatedly expressed -to begin with -by the inventor of the theorem itself, namely John S. Bell. This prejudice not only survives but in the last years has become even stronger, supported as it is by an emphasis on quantum computation that tends to dissolve all deep conceptual problems of standard quantum theory into a new informationtheoretic orthodoxy 22 . According to this prejudice, the core of the Bell theorem concerns a philosophical notion -realism -and proves that such notion is untenable on physical grounds, namely holding to it implies quantitative predictions that are contradicted by the quantum predictions. This interpretation sounds very much like the ultimate death sentence for realism, and 21 For a survey, see Dürr, Goldstein, Zanghì (1996) and for an illuminating analysis of the superiority of the recent formulation over the old one, see Goldstein (1996) , pp. 156-160. 22 For an interesting and recent assessment of this tendency see Hagar (2007) .
such a sentence seems hard to resist since it is physics which pronounces it, namely the queen of the hard sciences. As argued above, this approach overlooks the circumstance that, in order to assess the implications of a theorem, we have to be clear about the conditions under which the theorem can be proved, and one need not be a physicist to acknowledge it. What logical soundness and physical reasonableness suggest (sections 3-5) is that the role of Bell's theorem is not to set constraints on how 'realist' we are allowed to be about quantum systems but rather, much more interestingly, to characterize a structural property of any theory that aims to cover the domain of validity covered so far by quantum mechanics, namely non-locality. As a consequence, whether a theory aiming to supersede quantum theory will be 'realist', 'non-realist', 'half-realist' or 'one-third realist', this will concern the further conceptual and formal resources of that theory and not at all the Bell theorem.
